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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) is
a successful attempt by the international community to codify and unify
the law of the sea. After long negotiations, the LOSC opened for
signature at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
* B. Med. (Sun Yat-sen U), LL.B. (Hons) (Tas). Barrister and solicitor of the
Supreme Court of Tasmania, Australia.
(UNCLOS III) in 1982. Together with its two formal associations, the
Part X1 Implementation Agreement 19941 and the Straddling and
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement 1995, it is regarded as one of the
most comprehensive documents ever adopted by the international
community.3 The LOSC not only succeeded in addressing all topicsS 4
covered by its ancestors, the four 1958 Geneva Conventions, but it
actually succeeded in addressing much more. More importantly, at least
to this author's perception, it created a new approach in developing
customary international law by adopting a "package deal theory." This
article submits that by combining this innovative approach with three
other methods specified by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)-that
is, to codify or modify preexisting customary international norms, to
crystallize emerging customary international norms, and to initiate a
progressive process of developing customary international norms-the
LOSC represents customary international law to a very wide extent. As a
result, at least in the context of the law of the sea, the distinction
between treaty law and customary law is blurred.
II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Customary international law is the law that is derived from state
custom or practice. It is continuously evolving, mirroring fundamental
shifts produced by the ever-changing needs of the international
community, 5 and is honored as "the foundation stone of the modern law
of nations."6 It is also one of the sources of international law recognized
1. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 42.
2. The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened
for signature Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542.
3. Bo JOHNSON THEUTENBERG, THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA: A STUDY
OF RESOURCES AND STRATEGY WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO THE POLAR REGIONS, 7 (1984).
4. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of. the Living
Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 599 U.N.T.S. 285;
Convention on the Continental Shelf Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
See generally United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea,
"The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective)"
(1998), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/conventionagreements/conventionhistorical_
perspective.htm (last visited Jan. 26 2006).
5. Hugo Caminos & Michael R. Molitor, Perspectives on the New Law of the
Sea: Progressive Development of International Law and the Package Deal, 79 AM. J.
INT'LL. 871, 882 (1985).
6. MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 28 (Blackstone, 4th ed.
2000) (1990).
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by the authoritative statement of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which states: "The Court .. . shall
apply.., international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law. . . . Two elements are identified by the statute to. determine
whether custom exists in a particular circumstance: (1) general state
practice, or the actual behavior of states, and (2) the acceptance of a
practice by law, or opiniojuris-the conviction that the practice is either
required or allowed by customary international law. 8
Traditionally, legal theory requires these two elements be proven in
order to establish the existence of a rule of customary international law.
In regard to proving actual state practice, several factors should be taken
into account concerning the nature of the practice, including the duration
and repetition of the practice, the level of compliance by states,
uniformity, and consensus. These elements are flexible and depend on
surrounding circumstances. 9
However, modes of developing new rules of customary international
law have greatly changed since the Second World War. The result of
such changes is that the orthodox approaches to both the sources of
international law and the evaluation of evidence of the creation or
development of customary international law have been replaced by
international multilateral conventions.' 0 Although determining that a
specific treaty provision has becomes customary international law is
often difficult and complex," conventions are still regarded as alegitimate means of creating law. 12 Also, it is widely recognized that in
7. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060
T.S. 993 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]. The other sources are international conventions, the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, judicial decisions (subject to
the provisions of art. 59) and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations. See id.
8. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 58-59 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 4th
ed. 1997) (1977); R. R. CHURCHILL & A. V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA, 5-6 (rev. ed.
1988); Alexei Zinchenko, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and Customary Law,
http://www.geocities.com/enriquearamburu/CON/col5.html (last visited Sept. 2005).
9. SHAW, supra note 8, at 59-60.
10. See Louis B. Sohn, The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law
Developments, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 271, 273 (1984); Louis B. Sohn, "'Generally Accepted'
International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1073, 1078 (1986).
11. Kathryn Surace-Smith, United States Activity Outside of the Law of the Sea
Convention: Deep Seabed Mining and Transit Passage, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1032, 1035
(1984).
12. SHAW, supra note 8, at 73.
some circumstances conventions can generate customary rules of law
that are binding on all states, including nonparties. 13
The ICJ has identified three relatively uncontroversial circumstances
in which international conventions may be relevant to finding customary
international law. These circumstances are when a convention: (1) codifies
existing customary international law; (2) causes customary international
law to crystallize; and (3) initiates the progressive development of new
customary international law. In each of these circumstances, states'
negotiation and adoption of certain international agreements are evidence
of customary international law.1
4
Nonetheless, this does not end the inquiry. Scott and Carr argue that
three additional conditions must also be satisfied. First, a treaty must be
accepted by a sufficient number of states in the international system;
second, there must be a significant number of state parties to the treaty
whose interests are significantly affected by the treaty; and third, the
treaty provisions may not be subject to reservations by the signatories.
Scott and Carr argue that only when these additional conditions are
fulfilled is a multilateral treaty generalizable beyond the particulars of
the treaty to serve as a basis for customary international law. 
1 5
In addition to the circumstances addressed by the ICJ, UNCLOS III
adopted the "package deal theory"' 6 which has, arguably, opened a new
avenue in incorporating customary international law. Meanwhile, there
is also a proposal to adopt "declarative law." This term refers to those
state actions that are "not quite custom and not quite treaty" but might
themselves become binding or prompt the creation of more customary
law or treaty law. 17  However, for the purpose of discussing the
interrelation between the LOSC and customary international law, this
article only discusses the three methods depicted by the ICJ and the
package deal theory.
13. Surace-Smith, supra note 1I n. 10.
14. Jonathon I. Charney, International Agreements and the Development of
Customary International Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971, 971 (1986); see North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 37-39 (Feb. 20); Wladyslaw
Czaplinski, Sources of International Law in the Nicaragua Case, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
151, 153 (1989).
15. Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of
Customary International Law, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 71, 72 (1996).
16. Luke T. Lee, The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 541, 566 (1983).
17. Katherine N. Guernsey, Comment, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 27
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 141, 157-58 (2000).
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III. THE LOSC AND ITS ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTS REPRESENT
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW TO A WIDE EXTENT
The LOSC 1982 is a remarkable achievement. With 320 articles, nine
annexes and two formally associated international instruments-that is,
Part XI Implementation Agreement 1994 and Straddling and Migratory
Fish Stocks Agreement 1995-the LOSC is considered one of the most
comprehensive documents ever adopted by the international community.1
8
The LOSC covers all topics covered by the four 1958 Geneva Conventions
and many more. While many of its provisions repeat verbatim those of
the Geneva Conventions, some contain different or more detailed rules
on matters covered by the Geneva Conventions, and others spell out legal
regimes. 19 Environmental issues and the preservation and conservation of the
living natural resources of the sea are also given considerable space.
The Convention's aim is to rationalize the new tendencies relating to the
law of the sea and to achieve uniform international development of new
laws. 20 Its adoption is a successful incorporation of a large number of
customary international laws,2 1 and it serves as a comprehensive
multilateral treaty concerning the conduct of ships on the high seas and
in the territorial seas of foreign states.
In light of the ICJ's observation mentioned above, this article submits
that the LOSC not only represents customary international law to a wide
extent, but also constitutes an innovation in the development of customary
international law. In addition to codifying and modifying antecedent
customary international law, crystallizing emerging customary international
law or creating instant customary international law, and initiating a
progressive development of customary international law,22 the LOSC
employed--or, more exactly, pioneered-the "package deal" theory. In
some circumstances, these methods overlap.
18. See THEUTENBERG, supra note 3.
19. D. J. HARRIS, CASE AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 370 (Sweet &
Maxwell, 5th ed. 1998).
20. THEUTENBERG, supra note 3.
21. Lee, supra note 16, at 554.
22. Id. at 542-43.
A. Codifying and Modifying Preexisting Customary
International Law
A convention may codify preexisting customary international law and
bind non-party states. Apart from the ICJ ruling in the North Sea
Continental Shelf case,23 (see Customary International Law, supra), the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that, although
a treaty does not create obligations or rights for a third state without that
state's consent, 24 a rule set forth in a treaty may become binding on that
state as a customary rule of international law. 5 Caminos and Molitor
interpret this concept to mean that provisions of multilateral treaties that
reflect customary norms can be invoked either against, or by third
26states. For example, Article 2(6) of the U.N. Charter provides that states
that are not members of the United Nations shall "act in accordance with
these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of
international peace and security." As used in the U.N. Charter, these
principles signify the renunciation of force in international relations,2 7
non-intervention by the U.N. in the internal affairs of states, 28 the
sovereign equality of states and the right of self-determination.2 9 Because
these principles have been universally recognized as fundamental to
international law,30 there should be little doubt that they were preexisting
customary international norms prior to codification in the U.N. Charter.
Likewise, many antecedent customs have been incorporated into the
provisions of the LOSC. An example is innocent passage: the right
enjoyed by all ships to travel freely through another state's territorial
sea3 without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port
facility. 32 Such passage should not undermine peace, good order or security
of the coastal state,33 and should further be continuous and expeditious,
except for any stopping and anchoring incidental to ordinary navigation, or
where there is a need to render assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in
danger or distress.
34
23. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
24. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
25. Id. art. 38. See also Caminos & Molitor, supra note 5, at 879.
26. Caminos & Molitor, supra note 5, at 879.
27. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3 & 4.
28. Id. art. 2, para. 7.
29. Id. art. 1, para. 2; see also id. art. 2, para. 1.
30. Czaplinski, supra note 14, at 156.
31. U.N. Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, art. 17, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter LOSC].
32. Id. art. 18, para. 1.
33. Id. art. 19.
34. Id. art. 18, para. 2.
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In fact, the rule of innocent passage was an accepted state practice
prior to the passage of the LOSC. As early as 1869, the English common
law held that there was a public right of navigation in waters within the
boundaries of England for citizens and aliens alike. 35 That principle was
affirmed in a series of cases. 6 Underlying this idea is the view that
territorial seas must be beyond the limits of any single nation, otherwise
the right of innocent passage would be undermined. The U.S. Secretary
of State acknowledged the rule of innocent passage, articulated in
Foreman v. Free Fishers of Whitstable in 1886, and asserted it against
Spain in 1895 when an American ship was fired on off the coast of
Cuba.3 7 The Foreman rule was codified by several American states, as
well as internationally by the German Society of International Law and
The Hague Codification Conference.3 8 In 1958, the Geneva Convention
adopted the rule of innocent passage at the First United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), attended by eight-six
states.39 Considering the duration and extent of practice and uniformity4° of
the UNCLOS I, the first element of customary international law, actual
states' practice, is satisfied. In addition, court decisions and conventional
provisions lend support to the suggestion that the second element, opinio
juris, is also satisfied, because the legal obligations imposed by
UNCLOS I prevent the practice from being a mere "rule of comity or
courtesy.,,41
Apart from innocent passage, the LOSC also incorporates many other
principles that derive from custom. An example is the freedom of the
high seas guaranteed by Article 87, which states: "The high seas are
open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. ' '42 Another example is
the coastal state sovereignty over territorial waters under Article 2,
which provides: "The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its
35. See Foreman v. The Three Fishers and Dredgers of Whitstable, (1870) 4
L.R.E. & I. App. 266 (H.L.) (U.K.); D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
SEA 263-64 (.A. Shearer ed., 1982).
36. See R. v. Keyn, (1876) L.R. 2 Ex. D. 63 (U.K.).
37. O'CONNELL, supra note 35, at 265.
38. Id, at 266 n.46.
39. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone art. 14, Apr. 29,
1958 15 U.S.T. 1610, 516 U.N.T.S. 214. See also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 8, at
13; O'CONNELL, supra note 35, at 265-69.
40. Taking into account that many states today were the colonies of the British
Empire at the time, the number of state attendance should be larger.
41. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 8, at 6.
42. Id. at 165.
land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic
State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the
territorial sea." 
4 3
Nonetheless, convention provisions usually modify customary norms
to a certain extent. Otherwise, as Czaplinski notes, the usefulness of
codification is put in question, because it is rare for certain conventional
and customary regulations to be identical. 44 An example of this is the
size of a state's territorial sea. Prior to the UNCLOS III, the territorial
sea limit was three-miles under customary international law.45 The
three-mile limit, suggested by Galiani in 1782 and adopted by the United
States in 1793, gained widespread and rapid acceptance, and the limitation
survived throughout the 19th century. 6 Although in 1960 the great
majority of states still claimed territorial seas of less than twelve miles,
there was a steady shift towards wider territorial seas, especially among
newly independent states. By the closing stages of the UNCLOS
III, the great majority of states had reversed their earlier position,
claiming territorial seas of twelve miles or more. Article 3 of the LOSC
addressed this issue, modifying the three-mile preexisting customary
rule by providing that the breadth of the territorial sea may not exceed
twelve nautical miles.47 This change is a typical example of a modification
of preexisting customary international law. However, Article 3 may be a
product of the overlap between the modification of preexisting
customary international law and the crystallizing of emergent customary
international law. The latter will be discussed below.
Other examples of the modification of existing customary international
law may be seen in articles governing deep seabed mining and highly
migratory species fishing. Traditionally, deep seabed mining was
governed by the doctrine of freedom of the high seas,48 whereas Article
43. Scott & Carr, supra note 15, at 328-30 (discussing customary international law
and its influence on the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea).
44. Czaplinski, supra note 14, at 153-54.
45. O'CONNELL, supra note 35, at 165.
46. CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 8, at 65-66.
47. Id. at 66-67.
48. See Surace-Smith, supra note 11, at 1036-38 (discussing the freedom of the
high seas doctrine and the effect of the 1958 Convention of High Seas on seabed
mining). The Preamble of the 1958 Convention of the High Seas states that its purpose is
"to codify the rules of international law relating to the high seas" and to recognize "the
following provisions as generally declaratory of established principles of international
law." Art. 1 provides: "The term 'high seas' means all parts of the sea that are not
included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State." Art. 2 provides: "The
high seas being open to all nations . . . Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law."
Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
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134 of the LOSC provides that activities in the seabed 49 shall be
governed by Part XI of the LOSC.5° In addition, the traditional regime
allowed free fisheries on the high seas. 51 However, Article 64 of the
LOSC requires that "[t]he coastal State and other States . . . shall
co-operate ... with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the
objective of optimum utilization of such species... both within and
beyond the exclusive economic zone . . . ." These provisions of the
LOSC, as viewed by the author, have modified the traditional concept of
freedom of the high seas.
B. Crystallizing Emergent Customary International Law or
Creating Instant Customary International Law
In some decisions, the ICJ expressed its willingness to recognize not
only a text that codifies preexisting principles of international law, but
also one that crystallizes an "emergent rule of customary law."52 In the
North Sea Continental Shelf case, the ICJ held that once a principle is
generally accepted at an international conference, a rule of customary
international law can emerge even before the convention is signed. That
is, "a rule that is conventional in origin can pass into the general corpus
of international law and be accepted as such by the opinio juris and thus
'become binding even for countries which have never, and do not,
become parties to the Convention.' 53 The Court further added that this
constitutes one of the recognized methods by which new rules of
customary international law may be formed.54 The court in Tunisia v.
55 .. 56Libyan Arab Jamahiriya confirmed this position. As with the North
Sea Continental Shelf case,57 the ICJ held that it would "not ignore any
provision of the draft convention if it came to the conclusion that the
49. LOSC, supra note 31, art. 1, para. 1 (stating that the term "'Area' means the
sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.").
50. Id. at art. 134, para. 2 (stating that "activities in the 'Area' shall be governed
by the provisions of this Part."). See also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 8, at 182.
51. Convention on the High Seas art. 2(2), April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (explicitly stating that freedom of the high seas
comprises, inter alia, freedom of fishing).
52. Sohn, supra note 10, at 1077.
53. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb.
20). See also Sohn, supra note 10, at 1076.
54. Sohn, supra note 10, at 1076.
55. Continental Shelf (Tunis v. Libya), 1982 1.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24).
56. Sohn, supra note 10, at 278.
57. See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 39.
413
content of such a provision is binding upon all members of the international
community because it embodies or crystallizes a preexisting or emergent
rule of customary law." 58  Therefore, it is not difficult to see that
crystallizing emergent law is an important step in the formation of
customary international law, and represents an efficient way to create it.
In the context of the LOSC, there are also crystallized emergent
norms, for example, the adoption of the transit passage regime. Transit
passage is the exercise of freedom of navigation and overflight for the
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit between one part of the
high seas or exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and another part of the
high seas or EEZ. 59 In contrast to innocent6passage, transit passage permits
aircraft to fly through international straits. Additionally, transit passage
is allowed in "normal mode, 61 which, as Astley and Schmitt suggest,
is "a fact with direct military implications" that "is interpreted to
include launchinA and recovering aircraft and helicopters, 62 and is
non-suspendable.
It is widely accepted that transit passage is not a codification of
preexisting customary international law.64 The genesis of transit passage
was shaped by several interrelated factors and developments in the law
of the sea. Among them is the preservation of the high seas traditional
freedom of navigation and overflight in international straits that are
girded by often overlapping twelve-mile territorial sea claims. 65  This
problem was solved with the creation of the transit passage regime at the
UNCLOS 111.66 Thus, transit passage is an emergent rule of customary
law that was crystallized by the LOSC. Other examples include the right
of archipelagic sea lanes passage,67 the establishment of Exclusive
58. Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. at 38.
59, LOSC, supra note 31, art. 38, para. 2.
60. Id. art. 38, para. 1.
61. Id. art. 39(1)(c).
62. John Astley III & Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval
Operations, 42 A. F. L. REv. 119, 133 (1997).
63. LOSC, supra note 31, art. 44; see also, Astley & Schmitt, supra note 62, at 134.
64. Surace-Smith, supra note 11, at 1054; Zinchenko, supra note 8; Lee, supra
note 16, at 550; William L. Schachte, Jr. & J. Peter A. Bernhardt, International Straits
and Navigational Freedoms, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 527, 530-31 (1993).
65. Schachte & Bernhardt, supra note 64, at 530.
66. United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, supra note 4.
67. LOSC, supra note 31, art. 53(3)-(4) (stating that "[a]rchipelagic sea lanes
passage means the exercise in accordance with this Convention of the rights of
navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous,
expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an [EEZ] and
another part of the high seas or an [EEZ]", and "[s]uch sea lanes and air routes . . . shall
traverse the archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea..."). See also Lee, supra
note 16, at 563.
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Economic Zones (EEZ),68 recognition of the common heritage of mankind
for international seabed areas, and others.7°
C. Initiating Progressive Development of Customary
International Law
A third method of progressively developing customary international
law was formulated by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf
cases. 71 There, the ICJ addressed whether the Federal Republic of
Germany, which had signed but not yet ratified the 1958 Geneva
Continental Shelf Convention, should be bound by the delimitation
article (Article 6) so that the equidistance principle would be employed
to determine the boundary of the continental shelf between Germany,
Denmark and the Netherlands. In responding to Germany's argument
that it was not a party to the Convention and consequently should not be
subject to Article 6,72 the court accepted that Germany could not be
contractually bound by the Convention in the absence of ratification.
7 3
Nonetheless, the ICJ took the position that the absence of treaty
formalities did not necessarily preclude a State from being bound by
68. LOSC, supra note 31, part V, art. 55 (stating that "[t]he exclusive economic
zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal
regime established in [Part V of LOSCI, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the
coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant
provisions of this Convention."). See also Charney, supra note 14, at 987.
69. LOSC, supra note 31, art. 136 (stating that "[t]he 'Area' [as defined in art.
1 (1)] and its resources are the common heritage of mankind"). See also Lee, supra note
16, at 563.
70. One of the most noticeable examples is the new definition of the continental
shelf. Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf used the term
"continental shelf' to refer "(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent
to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas"; "(b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine
areas adjacent to the coasts of islands." Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 1, Apr.
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. By contrast, the LOSC
defines a coastal State's continental shelf as "the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where
the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance." LOSC,
supra note 31, art. 76. See also Chamey, supra note 14, at 988; Lee, supra note 16, at 563.
71. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
72. Id. at 20, para. 15.
73. Id. at 25, para. 27.
estoppel, where the State's past conduct and declarations were sufficient
to induce detrimental reliance by other States.74
The ICJ rejected the argument that Germany was bound by Article 6
through the doctrine of estoppel, finding Germany's acts did not provide
clear acceptance of the delimitation regime. 75 Germany could, however,
be bound by general international law or customary international law.
76
The ability of parties to make unilateral reservations to certain provisions
undermines the argument that such provisions represent codified
preexisting norms or crystallized emergent customary norms.77 As the
ICJ explained, customary international law must be equally binding on
all members of the international community.78 The ability of States to make
reservations to Article 6 was taken as evidence that the equidistance
method in that provision had not been intended to be an emerging
customary law.7 9Despite dismissing the emergent customary status of
Article 6, the ICJ created a new avenue for developing customary
international rules. The Court noted that, while articles subject to
reservation under a convention are generally not regarded as declaratory
of previously existing or emergent rules of law, such articles may
eventually pass into the general corpus of customary international law
through positive legal processes. 80 Such transitions can occur through
recognized methods of forming new rules of customary international
law, including the norm-creating character of the rule itself, the
widespread and representative participation of States in the convention,
and the existence of subsequent uniform state practice.81 Charney refers
to this method as initiating the progressive development of new law.
82
This author argues that the method of initiating progressive development
of customary international law should be applicable not only to those
articles that are subject to reservation, but also to those that are not
subject to reservation. In some situations, it may be difficult for certain
74. In discussing estoppel, the ICJ said
[W]hen a number of States ... have drawn up a convention specifically
providing for a particular method by which the intention to become bound by
the regime of the convention is to be manifested . . . it is not lightly to be
presumed that a State which has not carried out these formalities . . . has
nevertheless somehow become bound in another way.... [O]nly... the existence
of a situation of estoppel could suffice to lend 'substance to this contention.
Id. at 25-26, para. 28 & 30.
75. Id. at 26, para. 30-31.
76. Id. at 28-29, para. 37 (discussing the contentions of the Netherlands and Denmark).
77. Id. at 38-39, para. 63.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 39, para. 64.
81. Id. at 41-43, art. 71-75.
82. Charney, supra note 14, at 971.
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non-reservation provisions to fit within any of the aforementioned methods
of developing customary international law, despite the provisions'
binding force. An example is Part XI 1982 of the LOSC. Article 309 of
the LOSC provides that "[n]o reservations or exceptions may be made to
this Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of this
Convention." In the absence of any reservation article, Part XI 1982
would probably be excluded from the possibility of initiating the
progressive development of customary international law simply because
it is not subject to reservation.
Likewise, it is difficult for Part XI 1982 to ripen into customary
international law by codifying preexisting norms or by crystallizing
emerging customary norms. Although the LOSC was originally signed
by 119 states, 3 the customary status of Part XI 1982, a seabed mining
regime, was cast into doubt due to the objections made by the United
States and twenty-two other industrialized states. These states had a
strong interest in deep seabed mining activities and the governing
provisions no doubt would have affected them significantly.84 Hence, the
absence of consent of these interested states may have rendered the
conditions suggested by Scott and Carr (see Customary International
Law section above) unfulfilled. Consequently, Part XI 1982 could not
become customary international law through crystallization of emerging
customary norms. For the same reason, this section does not constitute a
codification of preexisting customary norms. Further, as the element of
state practice was not likely established, Part XI could not claim to be
traditional custom.
This article argues that Part XI 1982 should be able to initiate the
process of developing customary international law, similar to the reservation
provisions described above. Arguably non-reservation provisions are
closer to opinio juris than those provisions subject to reservation, and
such provisions satisfy the third condition suggested by Scott and Carr to
finding customary international law. If provisions subject to reservation
can initiate a process of developing new customary law, there is no
83. G.A. Res. 38/59. U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/59 (Dec. 14, 1983), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/38/a38r059.htm. On June 24, 2005, the number of
states parties increased to 148. See Press Release, States Parties to Law of the Sea
Convention to Meet in New York, U.N. Doc. SEA/1822 (June 16-24, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sea1822.doc.htm.
84. See U.S. Policy and the Law of the Sea, 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 54 (1982); Bernard
H. Oxman, Law of the Sea Forum: the 1994 Agreement on Implementation of the Seabed
Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 687, 688 (1994).
logical reason why Part XI 1982 should not be able to do so. If this view
is accepted, then the subsequent signing of the Part XI Implementation
Agreement 1994 by the United States and other industrial states may be
regarded-arguably-as a milestone on its journey of becoming recognized
customary law.
1. Package Deal Theory
The "package deal" theory was employed by the UNCLOS III in
negotiating and adopting the LOSC. This theory rules out any selective
application of the LOSC as "the problems of ocean space are closely
interrelated and have to be dealt with as a whole., 85 A remark by Deputy
Foreign Minister Gouzhenko of the former Soviet Union may be seen as
a good background against which to explain this approach:
The new Convention represents a complex and indivisible package of closely
interrelated compromise solutions to all major problems of the law of the
sea ... [O]ne cannot adopt a selective approach to the norms of international
law. The Convention is not a basket of fruit from which one can pick only those
one fancies. As is well known, the new comprehensive Convention has been
elaborated as a single and indivisible instrument, as a package of closely
interrelated compromise decisions.
86
Therefore, if it is accepted that the LOSC has generated any customary
international norms, those norms must be generated as a whole. That is,
new legal rights created by the LOSC cannot be claimed individually
by nonparties as customary norms. 87 Furthermore, as mentioned above,
the ICJ specified that consensus at a conference by a vast majority of the
participants is a legitimate method of creating a general norm of
international law.88 Thus, this article submits that at the time of consensus,
Part XI 1982 may have already become customary international law
since the majority of the LOSC was adopted as customary international
law. By extension, the two international instruments formally related
to the LOSC-the Part XI Implementation Agreement 1994 and the
Straddling and Migratory Fish Stock Agreement 1995-should be
managed with the LOSC as a whole under the package deal theory, as
these instruments form an indivisible trinity by their formal association
with the LOSC.
In some circumstances, the methods of developing customary
international law discussed above may overlap. For instance, adoption of
85. U.N. GAOR, 11 th Sess., 183rd plen. Mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.183
(Sep. 22, 1982) (quoting statement made by Ambassador Arias-Schreiber of Peru). See
Lee, supra note 16 n. 112.
86. See Caminos & Molitor, supra note 5, at 877.
87. Surace-Smith, supra note 11, at 1057.
88. See Sohn, supra note 10, at 279.
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the twelve-mile territorial sea limit at the UNCLOS III may be regarded
as both crystallizing the emergent customary international law and
codifying and modifying the preexisting norm, as discussed above. Part
XI 1982 represents another example where overlapping methods may
lead to the development of customary international law. Part XI can be
seen as obtaining customary international law status by initiating the
progressive development of customary international law, as well as by
incorporation under the package deal theory. These methods could also
be used to justify awarding customary law status to the two international
instruments formally associated with the LOSC. The Part XI Implementation
Agreement 1994 and the Straddling & Migratory Fish Stock Agreement
1995 figured as emergent norms, which became part of the LOSC
"package deal" as a result of consensus; they perhaps represent the
beginning development of customary international law as well. These
agreements may be regarded as either having been incorporated into
customary international law or progressing towards customary international
law.
On the other hand, some provisions may only represent practical
accommodations dependent upon an intricate web of interrelated bargains.
"The degree, therefore, to which a given provision may be defined as
evidentiary of the present opinion of [s]tates as to existing, emerging, or
preferred customary law, is difficult to fix." 89  However, it can be
confidently asserted that the LOSC and its formal associates, the Part XI
Implementation Agreement 1994 and the Straddling & Migratory Fish
Stock Agreement 1995, represent customary international law to a very
wide extent due to the combination of the formulas discussed above.
IV. CONCLUSION
Customary international law is constantly evolving in response to the
developing needs of the international community. The way in which
customary international law is created has also experienced great
change. Today, multilateral conventions have become the dominant
source of customary international law, and represent both a quicker and
more efficient means of establishing international norms than the older
methods. Unlike the traditional mode in which customary international
89. Lee, supra note 16, at 567 (quoting Brian Smith, Innocent Passage as a Rule
of Decision: Navigation v. Environmental Protection, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 49,
72(1982)).
law was developed by establishing actual state practice and opiniojuris,
multiple international conventions create customary international rules
through a host of different methods, Three relatively uncontroversial
methods were specified by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf
case: (1) codifying or modifying preexisting customary international
norms; (2) crystallizing emerging customary international norms; and
(3) initiating a progressive process of developing customary international
norms. All of these methods may be identified in the LOSC, and in its
associated Agreements. In addition, the LOSC has pioneered a fourth
avenue for creating customary international principles through the
adoption of its package deal theory, and is honored as "hav[ing] caused
[a] revolution in state practice." 90 This article submits that, through the
combined force of these four methods, the LOSC represents customary
international law to a very wide extent, and consequently binds all states
to its provisions, governing human activities on the ocean.
90. Zinchenko, supra note 8.
